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ABSTRACT 
 For automation industry, Information Technology (IT) is an essential production factor, but also a major expense post. 
Because cloud computing promises to deliver IT services more flexibly and cost-efficiently, it for automation industry 
prospectively.  However, given the high degree of regulation, concerns regarding security and compliance requirements 
arise. In this work, provide a theoretical analysis of security problems in the context of cloud computing. This analysis is 
complemented by the initial results of an ongoing case study concerning the practical relevance of these problems in the 
industry. The analysis confirms that security issues pose notable obstacles for the adoption of cloud computing in practice, 
but also points to appropriate countermeasures 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For automation industry, the collection, processing, and dissemination of large amounts of information constitute the 
basis for all processes [1]. Accordingly, industry institutions are among the most intensive users of Information Technology 
(IT) across various service industries. Following some controversy about the “productivity paradox” of IT in the, it has been 
empirically validated since that investments in IT may result in substantial returns, cost savings. Due to the constant 
decline in the absolute cost of IT equipment, many industry institutions have historically replaced other production factors 
with IT. This has led to a further increase in the relative importance of IT, compared to other production factors such as 
human labor. As a result, IT constitutes a major expense post for most industrial institutions today.  
Lately, cloud computing has arrived as a novel IT paradigm that promises to “revolutionize” the way IT services are 
provisioned and consumed. The essential idea of cloud computing is to deliver IT services – such as compute 
infrastructure or storage – in a utility-like manner , thus making these services ultimately more flexible and cost-efficient. 
Given the role of IT in the critical infrastructure  industrial , as an essential production factor, but also a major expense post, 
cloud computing may seem as a “perfect match” for this industry [2]. 
However, there appears to be one major obstacle: security. In fact, analysis confirmed that general security concerns 
and data privacy concerns constitute the most severe reasons for not using cloud computing.  It is reasonable to conclude 
that these concerns are especially pronounced in the critical infrastructure, which is among the most regulated sectors, 
and thus subject to rigid security requirements. 
Based on these observations, we examine the following research question in the work at hand: “Do security concerns 
pose an obstacle for the adoption of cloud computing in the critical infrastructure industry and, if yes, which concerns 
specifically”? We provide a theoretical analysis of potential security problems in conjunction with the application of cloud 
computing.  
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: In the following section, we provide an introduction into the 
fundamental concepts of cloud computing. In the subsequent section, analyse potential security with the use of cloud 
computing in the industrial systems.  Thereafter, we present the methodology and results of our ongoing empirical 
research. The paper concludes with a brief summary and outlook.  
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CLOUD TECHNOLOGY 
While the term cloud computing is currently very popular in research and practice today, no commonly accepted 
definition exists so far. Recently, however, the definition by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
emerged as a de-facto standard; it states that “Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources”. Such resources may include virtually any 
type of computing capabilities, including “networks, servers, storage, applications, and services”. In addition, the definition 
names five essential characteristics: First, the ability for consumers to commission and decommission capacities in an 
autonomous manner (on-demand self-service); second, the provision of capacities to heterogeneous end-user devices via 
the Internet (broad network access); third, the pooling and subsequent provision of resources according to a multi-tenant 
model, often based on virtualization techniques (resource pooling); fourth, the ability to rapidly add or remove capacities 
(rapid elasticity); fifth, a metered service provision, often based on a pay-per-use model (measured service). A basic 
taxonomy is cloud systems, which distinguishes four common deployment and three service models [3]. An overview is 
depicted in Figure 1. The deployment models essentially refer to the relationship between service provider and service 
consumer (also referred to as service user). In the case of a private cloud, a service is offered to one exclusive consumer, 
either by a provider from the same organization or by an external party. A community cloud, in contrast, is restricted to a 
pre-defined set of consumers, rather than an individual consumer. Lastly, a public cloud is operated by a specialized 
vendor; it is open to the general public or a large group of consumers. The term hybrid cloud can refer to any combination 
of aforementioned deployment models. In general, economies of scale increase moving from a private to a public cloud, 
whereas the control of the user over the overall cloud system decreases [5].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Common cloud deployment and service models 
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The service models refer to the level of complexity that a cloud service provides. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
includes the provision of rather low-level IT capabilities, such as storage or compute power. Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
refers to somewhat more sophisticated offers, such as programming and execution environments. Lastly, Software as a 
Service (SaaS) includes complex applications, which are often operated on the basis of IaaS or PaaS services. In general, 
the complexity of the services increases moving from IaaS to SaaS, whereas the degree of (technical) standardization 
appears to decrease [6]. 
3. SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR CLOUD TECHNOLOGY 
Recently, a growing number of researchers have been concerned with the issue of security in cloud computing. In our 
theoretical analysis, we pursued the aim of reviewing the existing literature and consolidating these findings in a structured 
manner, thus giving us a basis for the subsequent empirical investigation. As the guideline of analysis, used the ten 
security domains of the well-known Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certificate [7]. These 
domains cover diverse aspects of security, ranging from physical security of computing facilities, business continuity 
planning for disaster scenarios, to the application of cryptography techniques. Most of these domains can be found in 
identical or comparable form in other IT security guides, e.g., by the Cloud Security Alliance or the Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association. Thus, while not specifically tailored to cloud computing, but rather IT in general, the CISSP 
domains provide a comprehensive scheme for the classification of security issues. Accordingly, mapped each security 
problem or risk that found in the literature onto one of the ten CISSP domains. In addition, identified specific security 
objectives that may be threatened by each problem or risk. In this context, we focused on the three “classic” security 
objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, which have been well-known for many years as part of the so-called 
“CIA triad“. Confidentiality describes that information may only be read by authorized parties; in this context, authorization 
refers to the fact that these parties possess appropriate access rights [8]. Lastly, availability means that information or a 
system is accessible in a timely and reliable way whenever needed. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE INDUSTRY SYSTEMS 
A. Methodology 
In order to empirically assess our research question and examine the practical significance of the previously identified, 
cloud computing-related security issues, chose the qualitative research approach of a case study. 
With respect to this instrument, different designs are described in the literature, which exhibit specific advantages and 
disadvantages. In work, pursue a holistic, multi-case design. In this context, holistic means that industry institutions as a 
whole – and not their individual units or departments – constitute the matter of examination. Chosen a multi-case design 
due to the potentially higher robustness and explanatory power of such design. As primary data source, selected the 
instrument of personal interviews with domain experts. As major strengths, this instrument permits a targeted examination 
of the case study topic and can be highly insightful. However, due to different forms of bias in the responses, the results 
should also be subject to careful interpretation. 
As the basis for the interviews, compiled a questionnaire consisting of roughly 40 individual questions. Using this 
questionnaire, conducted interview with two representatives of a industry institutions Azerbaijan. Both interviewees work in 
the IT department of their institute, with a specific focus on IT security, and have previously gained professional 
experience with respect to cloud computing. In the following, we will refer to the interviewees as A and B. 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour in time. Both interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently 
transcribed into written text. 
The transcripts and notes were analyzed using the method of qualitative content analysis. This method is among the 
recommend procedures for the analysis of expert interviews. The analysis process involves five steps, including a 
summary and codification of statements, and ultimately results in deduction of scientific concepts. In contrast to more 
complex analysis procedures, such as the coding method, the qualitative content analysis requires less initial effort and is 
thus [9].  very well suited for the deduction of preliminary results 
B. Preliminary Results 
The entire document should be in Times New Roman or Times font.  Type 3 fonts must not be used.  Other font types 
may be used if needed for special purposes. 
Given the restricted number of interviews that have been conducted to date, the following results should be considered 
preliminary. In addition, because both interviewees are associated with a industry, the discussion of results focuses on the 
critical infrastructure. However, initial results can provide valuable insights with respect to the research question [10]. 
To begin with, the interviews confirmed the notion that the term cloud computing is interpreted very widely. Specifically, 
interviewee B stated that “[cloud computing is] a dazzling term, which is used for a multitude of things and not clearly 
defined.” In general, the interviewees agreed, however, that cloud computing involves the provision of services from a 
shared environment via a (public) network. These services are standardized and ready-to-use. 
All three service models in cloud computing are of relevance to the automation industry. However, according to the 
interviewees, cloud computing will not be the dominant delivery model in any critical infrastructure, because some 
processes cannot be outsourced to third parties.  Automation industry which are subject to constant change, are 
specifically suited for the application of cloud computing. 
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Among the delivery models, private cloud computing has the highest relevance. A private cloud can serve as central 
service, which is used by the critical infrastructure itself or its outsourced partners. According to both interviewees, IT in 
the critical infrastructure is subject to a broad range of risks. These risks relate to people, processes, systems, and 
external factors. Damages may not only concern virtual goods, but also physical goods, such as data centers, facilities, or 
employees. Interviewee A also pointed to non-financial damages, for instance “risks in terms of reputation”. Interviewee B 
sees the inability to judge the reliability of cloud services as a major problem, given that processing failures may lead to 
substantial risks for the institute. 
With respect to the first CISSP domain, “information security governance”, both interviewees saw the application of 
appropriate monitoring as an essential prerequisite for the use of cloud services. Thus, according to interviewee B, a cloud 
provider will have to comply with “extensive manuals and policies” and certify its adherence to those rules. As a specific 
technical mechanism, interviewee A named the use of trusted platform modules, which guarantee that “only warranted 
operations can be conducted on specific data”. In addition, the encryption of critical data is seen as an appropriate 
measure. 
Interviewee B did not see the risk of a vendor lock-in with standardized services in the critical infrastructure industry. 
Still, critical infrastructure should be very aware about the dependence on specific vendors. 
Concerning the second CISSP domain, “Access Control”, interviewee B saw the risk of an abuse of administrative 
privileges as valid scenario, with enormous potential for attacks. Thus, administrative personnel should “underlie a detailed 
monitoring”. Both interviewees pointed out that critical data, including authentication credentials, should always be 
transferred via secured channels. With respect to the theft of user accounts, “two-factor authentication” was named as a 
technical countermeasure. 
In the context of the third CISSP domain, “Cryptography”, both interviewees stressed the significance of appropriate 
monitoring solutions to address potential security issues. As a technical measure, interviewee A further pointed to the use 
of client-based encryption mechanisms, which ensure that data “is [exclusively] written back to the cloud in encrypted form” 
(i.e., end-to-end encryption is enforced). Both interviewees further stressed that the distinction between data-at-rest and 
data-in-transit is important for the choice of appropriate security mechanisms, such as channel encryption. 
With respect to the fourth CISSP domain, “Physical Security”, the use of appropriate monitoring solutions and 
enforcement of policies at the cloud provider is seen as important aspect again. Both representatives agreed that potential 
damages do not only concern virtual, but also physical goods, such as data centers or facilities. In this respect, 
interviewee A believes that “cyber war and cyber terrorism will play a certain role [in the future]”. 
Concerning the fifth CISSP domain, “Security Architecture and Design”, interviewee B identified the comprehensive 
training of employees as an important measure to raise the awareness of security problems. This does not only concern 
“the employees [of the institute itself], but everyone you has access to a company’s systems, because today, multiple 
[external] service providers are employed”. In this context, interviewee A specifically pointed to the risk through cloud-
based man-in-the-middle attacks, saying that a lack of awareness at both the user and provider side would create 
“completely new opportunities”, specifically with respect to eavesdropping. Once again, trusted platform modules are 
perceived as a viable technical countermeasure to address many security problems. 
With respect to the sixth CISSP domain, “Business Continuity Planning (BCP)”, the failure of communication channels, 
namely access to the Internet, was acknowledged as a relevant risk. Interviewee A named legal agreements with the 
network providers as appropriate countermeasure, saying that “depending on the risk of the processed data  there has to 
exist a disaster recovery scenario in the case of a cloud setting; you have to be able to substitute [network capabilities]”. 
In the context of the seventh CISSP domain, “Telecommunications and Network Security”, the interviewed 
representatives stressed the importance of monitoring to detect attacks that aim at an exploitation of network or computing 
capacities. Interviewee A further stated that redundant resources should be made available, depending on the criticality of 
systems or data. 
With respect to the eighth and ninth CISSP domains, “Application Development Security” and “Operations Security”, 
both interviewees referred to the same mechanisms that were previously discussed with respect to the first domain. This 
includes the use of appropriate monitoring mechanisms and the enforcement of policies by the critical infrastructure as 
service user. 
Lastly, concerning the tenth CISSP domain, “Legal, Regulations, Investigations, and Compliance”, interviewee B 
acknowledged that the inability to localize data in clouds may constitute an important obstacle for their adoption, given that 
this situation may result in judicial or regulatory problems. Once again, monitoring is seen as a potentially appropriate 
countermeasure. The physical location of data most notably plays a major role due to different jurisdictions. 
In summary, we found that many of the security issues with cloud computing that we identified in our theoretical 
analysis are also acknowledged by practitioners from the industrial practice. In many cases, appropriate monitoring or 
trusted platform solutions are named as appropriate technical countermeasures. In addition, it appears that critical 
infrastructure tend to use the instrument of legal agreements and compliance rules to mitigate risks and shift the financial 
and legal responsibility for security issues to the cloud providers. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the automation industry, IT is one of the substantial production factors, and its relative importance has steadily 
increased in recent decades. However, IT also poses a major expense post. Cloud computing is a novel architectural 
paradigm that promises to revolutionize the way IT services are provisioned and consumed. Due to its potential for cost-
savings and its flexibility, cloud computing may appear as a perfect match to the industrial systems. However, security 
concerns have recently been named as a potential sticking point for the adoption of cloud computing, specifically in the 
critical infrastructure which is subject to a multitude of regulatory requirements. 
In this work,  to analyze whether security concerns pose an obstacle for the application of cloud computing in the critical 
infrastructure. For that matter, we identified a set of potential cloud-related security risks, based on a survey of current 
literature. Subsequently, empirically verified findings through an ongoing case study in the industrial systems. 
According to the interviews with two experts, security concerns do in fact constitute an obstacle for the adoption of 
cloud computing. This is specifically true with respect to the public cloud computing deployment model. Accordingly, this 
model is only applied to a very limited extent at present. However, potential for the application of cloud computing is seen 
across all critical infrastructure in the industry area. 
On the basis of the case study analysis, it appears that critical infrastructures focus on both legal and technical 
measures to address potential security problems. The former include legal agreements with cloud providers and the 
enforcement of security-related manuals and policies; the latter include the use of encryption and trusted platform modules. 
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